As Democrats sweep back into power, too many of them are looking to take aim at America’s most successful businesses. One likely target of their evident ire is Elon Musk, the inventor and entrepreneur who spent nearly half a billion futile dollars supporting Republican candidates, especially in Texas, during the midterm election: so much for any close connection between wealth and political power.
Before the election, that lesson was not apparent to former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, who had unwisely suggested that the federal government defang the trillionaire by nationalizing SpaceX and Starlink. The putative reason for this daring maneuver is to strip Musk of his supposed excessive political power—even as all his spending did naught to help Republican candidates.
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While Democrats are breathing fire, targeting Musk, they tended to overlook the many undisputed excesses of Trump’s second term, which desperately needs some bipartisan changes on such hot-button issues of tariffs and immigration enforcement, to say nothing of Trump’s vulgar self-promoting by building and naming monuments to himself. Instead, today’s self-styled modern progressives are devising techniques to rein in some ill-defined Musk “oligarchy.” Reich’s proposal for nationalization is vastly different from—and far worse than—the more traditional regulatory reforms applied to railroads and public utilities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The first obstacle to this scheme is that Reich has made no mention of compensating Musk and his fellow shareholders. Historically, the initial round of regulatory initiatives always required compensation to avoid the risk of confiscation, even as courts differed on selecting an accounting method for determining the proper amount owed.
Apart from safety issues, in the historical actions against the railroads and public utilities, government intervention primarily concerned regulating the rates charged to consumers. Steady innovation, rather than radical transformation, was both the ideal and the practice, so the increase in government control had only a relatively modest effect on firm operation. There were no efforts at outright nationalization, as Reich has proposed, thereby allowing stock and bondholders to retain control of both long-term planning and daily operations.
During the late 1960s, as the speed of innovation in communications increased, recognizing the risks of keeping rates higher than the pace of innovation demanded, Harold Demsetz and Richard Posner both concluded that the gains from unregulated innovation effectively blunted the monopoly threat, thereby undermining the case for government intervention. Demsetz and Posner’s prediction proved more accurate in telecommunications than in public utilities, as the heavy sunk costs of fixed infrastructure in the latter case have prolonged the use of traditional regulatory schemes.
In short, while it has varied in aggressiveness, the history of American business regulation has always steered away from outright confiscation. The system also gained a strong measure of credibility because the targeted industries had a fair measure of monopoly power, so that rate regulation was an intelligible effort to split the uprights by preventing the creation of monopoly power on the one side while stopping confiscation on the other, which if allowed could stem the future large investments needed to build out and maintain the operation. Against this backdrop, the proposal to nationalize Musk’s companies is a clear effort to destroy the wealth that he and his team have created.
Many progressives and democratic socialists argue that Musk’s wealth is unearned. But Musk, the man, is an incredibly valuable firm-specific human asset, and his companies, like other firms in the information space, depend primarily on human assets, not physical ones. Anyone with a laptop can make real innovations in this space, which can then be licensed or sold to larger businesses. The success of Tesla and SpaceX depends critically on their integrated operations, which is what makes generation-hopping innovation possible. Ultimately, that success rests on Musk’s ability to develop a master strategy and organize his teams to implement it better than his competitors, all of whom had the same access to public resources, without the same results.
Musk’s independent directors, who control his companies’ purse strings, understand the proposition: other shareholders, employees, and suppliers can get rich if Elon Musk gets rich. But the success of Musk’s companies, chiefly Tesla and SpaceX, depends critically on the complex integration of a business that treats the status quo as something to be torn down and reengineered. It’s no mystery that his outsized compensation packages have repeatedly been carried by large majorities, knowing that he gets his take only if he meets their targets. His wealth, in short, is earned.
This is why it is ludicrous for Reich to say: “When I say defund Musk, you know, 75 percent of his wealth is dependent on taxpayers who are buying Starlink systems for the Department of Defense.” Taxpayers are not ripped off in these arm’s-length transactions; Reich offers no evidence that the deals included inflated prices or inferior products. The United States buys Musk’s systems because they are the best in the world.
Nor does government seed capital in basic research justify nationalizing these firms. Since Vannevar Bush—America’s masterful scientific czar during the Second World War—published his 1945 report, Science: The Endless Frontier, America has employed a system in which the government funds basic research, establishing knowledge and principles that private firms can then use to develop their own products protected by secure patents. To say these public contributions justify the nationalization of a business effectively repudiates Bush’s original model, notwithstanding its spectacular success, enlarged through the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which encouraged universities and scientists to patent their research so that it would not languish in the public domain.
Nobody has enjoyed the privileges of this arrangement as much as Musk. But his own contributions have also been immense. Seizing his firm will result in Musk and his fellow thinkers either tossed out the door or leaving of their own accord. The now-booming firm would become a shell of its former self, as a penny-pinching government bureaucracy seeks to run a dynamic enterprise on an infinitesimal pay scale.
It remains an open question whether the Democrats will follow Reich’s suicidal prescription. Musk relocated his companies to Texas to escape the silliness of the Delaware Chancery Court, which voted to reject a shareholder-approved pay package. At the time, Texas was clearly pro-business, exemplified by its creation of the specialized Texas Business Court. But what happens if Texas’s incoming Democratic governor, Gina Hinojosa, tries to rein in Musk’s activities? She’s promised stricter controls on data centers, a key part of his operation; more could come.
Texas is just one state where the Democrats have gained control. The coming months could prove consequential for the American republic. The Democratic Party could swing back toward moderate, center-left policies, or proceed down a more radical path. Now is the time to remember how plans that sound appealing—like seizing Musk’s wealth—can cause untold economic and social destruction.