The shooting of two West Virginia National Guard members in an ambush attack near the White House—allegedly by Rahmanullah Lakanwal, an Afghan national admitted under a Biden-era resettlement program—has thrust immigration policy into the spotlight once again. Similarly, recent reporting by City Journal on Somali fraud rings has exposed massive theft of Minnesota social service funds, fueling broad public skepticism of immigration.
President Trump vowed that his administration would “permanently pause” migration from all “Third World Countries.” It is now reviewing Biden-era asylum cases and green card applications from 19 high-risk countries—most already restricted from immigration benefits in June 2025—and may soon add at least ten more countries to the travel ban list. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem has urged Trump to go further, calling for a sweeping travel ban on “every damn country that’s been flooding our nation with killers, leeches, and entitlement junkies.”
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, meantime, has rolled out new changes to the review process for immigration benefits and naturalization, as well as halting decisions on all asylum cases and freezing green-card, naturalization, and other citizenship-related applications for immigrants from the 19 “high-risk” countries. And under a new State Department policy taking effect on December 15, H-1B workers and their H-4 families must make social-media accounts public so consular officers can comb through posts, connections, and work history as part of a more stringent security-vetting process. While these measures may appear responsive to security concerns, they overlook the reality that countless legal migrants will be left in bureaucratic limbo by blanket freezes, and they wrongly target H-1B and H-4 workers—who are not the primary source of “bad” migration—as a proxy for a broader immigration problem.
The instinct to respond to a horrific crime with tougher policy is both understandable and within the president’s authority. But blanket bans would serve only to punish the U.S., along with the rest of the world. Fortunately, President Trump can take several steps short of a ban to enhance both American security and prosperity.
Trump’s June 2025 proclamation, imposing sweeping restrictions on nationals of 19 countries, explicitly relies on two provisions in law. Under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the president may “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” whose entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Similarly, Section 215(a) lets him prescribe “limitations and exceptions” on entry and departure. The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Trump v. Hawaii upheld his earlier travel ban, stressing that §1182(f) gives the president broad discretion on national‑security grounds. That precedent is exactly why the administration believes it can make a “Third World migration ban” stick.
But if the president’s goal is to protect Americans and strengthen the economy, then his changes to immigration policy should be aimed at filtering immigrants in a smart way. A blanket “Third World” ban ignores the fact that not all migration is equal. Some channels are clearly good for the United States—high-skill immigrant visas, STEM-focused student visas, and employment-based green cards. For others, the risk-to-return ratio is high—humanitarian programs, chain migration, entrants with no realistic means of support, and immigrant categories or countries with chronically high rates of fraud and visa overstay. These channels can be tightened.
But filtering for high-skilled immigrants is not enough; age, education, and legal status matter, too. Highly educated workers and those in their prime working years tend to be net fiscal contributors; low-skilled adults out of the labor force or dependent on safety-net programs are more likely to impose short-term costs, especially at the state and local level.
A more selective immigration policy would likely enjoy popular support. In a recent Manhattan Institute survey, only a small portion of respondents said the U.S. should reduce high-skilled immigration. Over 82 percent of respondents said that they would prefer high-skilled migration to be increased or stay at the same level.
Trump should side with the majority of Americans, protecting visas like F-1 for full-time study, H-1B and O-1 for high-skilled work, and targeted temporary worker programs like H-2A and H-2B, on which U.S. agriculture and construction depend. The president should make sure that his “Third World” proposal does not include many of the H-2A workers needed to keep food prices down and housing construction moving.
Other, more straightforward ways than blanket bans can filter migrants by the risk they pose. For example, under existing law, a president has unilateral power to shorten the duration of many visas. He can direct the State Department to reduce, say, a five-year multiple-entry tourist visa to a one-year or single-entry document for high-risk countries, using the same executive authority that already governs visa validity and reciprocity.
The U.S. could also move toward shorter, more purpose-specific visas for visitors and students from countries with high overstay rates. Instead of handing out multiyear entry documents, consulates could issue shorter-duration B visas, forcing more frequent renewal and re-screening.
Similarly, an immigrant’s ability to assimilate should inform immigration decisions. For instance, Lakanwal, the National Guard shooting suspect, had difficulty finding stable employment in the U.S., contributing to his declining mental state. Immigrants who are regularly employed tend to be more culturally assimilated than those without strong workplace ties.
Under his authority as president, Trump can issue more tourist visas that require proof of an event—for example, the World Cup, an academic conference, or a short training session. Such visas are valid only for the duration of the event, plus a brief buffer for entry and exit, and are ineligible for changes of status.
The administration can also raise the evidentiary bar at consular interviews. Under §214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, most nonimmigrant visa applicants must convince a consular officer that they will leave the U.S. at the end of their stay. In practice, that standard largely depends on the judgment of the consular officer. One way to narrow that discretion is to expand documentation requirements, including detailed itineraries, concrete proof of a trip’s purpose, and more granular financial records, like bank statements, employment contracts, and tax returns. These documents are currently strongly recommended but not required for a consular officer to grant a visa.
The D.C. National Guard shooting also raises a thorny question: What about people who pass every formal security check and then radicalize or break down while in the U.S.? Lakanwal had worked with a CIA-linked Afghan special forces unit and was vetted multiple times. Now he is charged with first-degree murder.
No ban list of 30 or 40 “bad” countries can solve this problem. Better to focus on whom we admit and how we monitor high-risk cohorts. Former combatants, people with severe trauma, and nationals from active conflict zones should receive more intensive interviews and be subject to better data-sharing with allies, mental-health screenings, and some structured follow-up after arrival. When things go wrong, the law already allows for removal on broad criminal and security grounds.
If Trump is serious about protecting Americans rather than just punishing foreigners, this is the path he should take.
Photo by Madison Thorn/Anadolu via Getty Images