In late August, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Masar Badil, an international revolutionary-minded Palestinian support organization, as a cover for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The action followed the 2024 U.S. and Canadian designations of the closely aligned Samidoun network—which presented itself as a “Palestinian prisoner solidarity” organization—as a PFLP front. These acts were meant to strike a blow against the alleged terror-linked organizations.
Yet recent events show how little the sanctions have disrupted the network on the ground. Last week, news broke that one of Masar Badil’s youth affiliates secured a generous plea deal following a campus occupation at the University of Washington that resulted in more than $1 million in damage. In November, Masar Badil is set to host a conference in Toronto titled “3 Years of Al-Aqsa Flood”—Hamas’s name for the October 7 massacre—despite the U.S. sanctions.
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Though the sanctions struck at the organizations’ formal structures and leadership, they have done little to blunt their influence. Across North America, a growing number of affiliate groups increasingly cast themselves as Samidoun’s successors, adopting a politics of “strategic risk” and “intentional sacrifice in pursuit of the liberatory struggle,” and normalizing “revolutionary violence.” More decisive action is needed to curb this growing threat.
The Masar Badil network is extensive. One prominent affiliate, Al-Ahrar, operates as a prisoner-support organization in the mold of the now-sanctioned Samidoun. The organization’s purported mission is a euphemistic sleight of hand that ignores the fact that the prisoners in question are often terrorists and militants. The term “prisoners” also plays on the sympathies of many Western leftists, who have been conditioned to view such captives primarily as victims rather than as perpetrators of violence. Al-Ahrar identifies itself as part of Masar Badil and maintains chapters in Toronto, New York, and New Jersey. The group claims that it “emerged in January 2025 from the ashes of imperialist repression” following the designation of Samidoun in January 2025 and that it “fill[s] the gap“ left by Samidoun’s inability to continue operating as a public-facing organization.
Other affiliates operate within the Tariq El-Tahrir Youth and Student Network, Masar Badil’s youth wing. These include groups like Alkarama, SUPER UW at the University of Washington, and Nidal. Together, these organizations have helped extend Masar Badil’s influence across North America despite repeated sanctions.
Even this accounting likely understates the network’s reach. While the 2024 designation of Samidoun made many organizations reluctant to associate with it publicly, its influence did not disappear. Beyond its formal organizations lies a broader ecosystem of activists and advocacy groups across the West that, while not formally tied to Masar Badil or Samidoun, often look to their affiliates for guidance and political leadership.
Just days before Masar Badil’s designation, the Workshops 4 Gaza collective hosted “One Day We Will All Be Terr*rists: On Designations, Counterinsurgency & the Path of Resistance,” providing a glimpse into how this network operates. During the event, representatives of Al-Ahrar Toronto argued at length that terrorist designations are intended to “criminalize resistance movements.”
Al-Ahrar Toronto’s two presenters, Cat and Amira, hid their faces behind keffiyehs, but they were open books about their ideology and goals. Their core thesis was that the concept of “terrorism” should be rejected entirely because the term functions as a counterinsurgency tool. By labeling a group as connected to terrorism, they argued, governments isolate revolutionary movements from potential allies and pressure activists to moderate their politics.
According to the presenters, Al-Ahrar is guided by the Palestinian “resistance leadership, not by Western legality.” Criminalization would not stop their work, they said. The first step for organizers, according to the presenters, is to provide unconditional political support to people and organizations facing “terror counterinsurgency” regardless of the allegations, convictions, or tactics involved. Organizers were even warned against distancing themselves from groups like Antifa or Atlanta’s Stop Cop City protesters—whose antics resulted in one activist’s death—in an effort to protect themselves or appear respectable.
Unsurprisingly, the speakers also defended a “diversity of tactics” when it comes to attaining their goals. They played a video of a Stop Cop City activist refusing to condemn the destruction of property and arguing that Atlanta deserved worse, and that protesters should use “every means necessary.” Al-Ahrar’s organizers presented the video as a textbook example of rejecting the idea that activists need to condemn more controversial tactics.
The Al-Ahrar workshop ended with a call for activists to embrace “strategic risk and intentional sacrifice.” The presenters argued that a “total rejection of risk” would reduce radical organizing to “state-sanctioned activism that doesn’t actually challenge or threaten the imperialist machine.” Instead, activists were encouraged to “nurture the spirit of sacrificing our comfort for the collective liberation.”
The Q&A reinforced the point. One participant asked about publicly associating with Samidoun and even Al-Ahrar despite the terrorism designation. The presenters’ response was to “challenge the idea of safety” and refuse to abandon their comrades “that explore the more higher risk.”
As the emergence of Al-Ahrar demonstrates, the PFLP-aligned movement is alive and well and extending its influence. During the workshop, Al-Ahrar also promoted the upcoming Masar Badil conference, which will serve as an opportunity for the network to plan, refine its strategy, and determine “the road ahead” for the Palestinian movement.
Conventionally, sanctions dry up funding pipelines to smaller and lesser-known groups, allowing them to wither away. Yet today, many offshoots continue to receive support and remain active. Others conceal their affiliation with the broader network, as discussed during the workshop’s Q&A. Super UW’s recent plea deal suggests that the full extent of these affiliations and networks remains poorly understood, at least at the local level.
A broader domestic investigation into the Masar Badil/PFLP-linked network is warranted. This is especially so given its links to organizations like the Democratic Socialists of America. Michelle Munjanattu, the partner of longtime DSA leader David Duhalde, is a member of Samidoun, while Charlotte Kates, a Samidoun international coordinator, has participated in DSA events. Kates also serves as the coordinator of the far-left U.S. National Lawyers Guild’s International Committee—another case where the Masar Badil network’s reach extends beyond Palestinian activism and into broader political and legal spheres.
Masar Badil and the broader PFLP-linked network continue to exercise surprising influence. To counter it more effectively, the federal government should look beyond sanctions and focus on dismantling the support structures, affiliated organizations, and personnel that allow these groups to persist despite repeated enforcement actions. Failing to do so risks further radicalization and the continued spread of semiautonomous groups operating under their banner.