Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images

When news drops on Friday, it’s usually because its announcer wants it buried. That’s the best explanation for why Mayor Zohran Mamdani waited until this Friday to put out a glossy video announcing his plan to close the New York City’s jail complex on Rikers Island.

The naïve viewer would assume that Mamdani was proposing a brilliant new approach to shuttering the controversial facility—he claims explicitly that “our administration is closing Rikers Island, once and for all.” In reality, Mamdani’s announcement is an admission of defeat. Under a 2019 city law, Rikers is supposed to close next summer. Mamdani’s new plan pushes that date back to 2032—tacitly admitting that 2027 was never going to happen.

The reason for the delay is obvious: none of the four borough-based jails meant to replace Rikers is ready yet. As the administration now admits, the Brooklyn borough jail will not open until 2029; the Queens and Bronx jails until 2031; and the Manhattan Borough jail until 2032. And these are optimistic timelines—the jails have already been delayed, and there’s no guarantee that they won’t be delayed again.

Mamdani’s admission of defeat on the timeline suggests that he is sufficiently connected to reality to recognize that he cannot close Rikers without up-and-running replacements. More alarming is the mayor’s sustained belief that the city can safely detain everyone it needs to while cutting the average daily jail population to just 4,100. The administration has failed to grapple with the hard math inherent in Rikers’s closure.

As of this writing, about 6,600 people are detained on Rikers. Per data I’ve collected, the average monthly population has not dropped below 6,000 since early 2023. The administration would need to cut the population by nearly 40 percent, in other words, to hit its target.

It’s certainly trying. As the New York Post reported on Thursday, the administration met with the city’s five district attorneys—independently elected in each borough—to ask, “if there are any cases where alleged criminals were ordered held on bail that could be revisited to thin out the jail population.”

Unsurprisingly, “prosecutors found that ultimately few suspects could be sprung,” the Post notes. That’s because, on any given day, roughly half of Rikers detainees are there on serious, violent offenses, and that share has risen as the jail’s population shrank over the past decade. The remainder are, by definition, flight risks—if they weren’t, they wouldn’t be eligible for detention under New York State’s hyper-restrictive bail law.

To close the gap, the administration offers four strategies: increasing pretrial diversion (thus reducing 500 beds); making it easier to pay bail or get alternative release conditions (700 beds); making cases move faster (800 beds); and introducing recidivism-reduction programming (500 beds). These approaches are an exercise in wish casting: Mamdani’s team knew what number it had to reach and seems to have worked backward from that conclusion to their estimates.

Take, for example, case-processing time. As the city’s plan notes, the average time people spend in jail has risen from 63 days in 2017 to 102 days last year. Case-processing times have been a fixation of closure advocates for years; they insist that the city just needs to move faster.

But as I have explained, rising case-processing times are a necessary result of removing low-level, less serious offenders from the jail population. If you trim away the easy cases, then only hard cases remain—and these, by definition, take longer to process.

Even more farcical is the administration’s proposal to slim the daily population by reducing recidivism. To accomplish this goal, it floats the usual progressive favorites: more free housing for “justice-involved populations” and more money for reentry programming. The administration asserts that the projected 500-bed reduction attributable to these policies is supported by “rigorous studies of comparable services for populations experiencing cycles of frequent arrests.” The few studies the administration’s report cites, though, do not obviously translate to the New York context. Programs that have been shown to reduce recidivism in low-level or otherwise amenable populations will not obviously help the hardened few who remain on Rikers.

The administration also fails to confront the most important question: What if crime goes up? New York is currently experiencing historic lows across various crime categories. But no iron law requires that crime stay low forever. As I’ve noted, the daily jail population is tightly correlated with the crime rate. Imagine that all of Mamdani’s population-reduction plans work—what, then, if the jail population exceeds the lower level, simply because more dangerous people need to be detained?

As I have explained, this is not an academic question. Population exceeding the jail’s capacity either means the release of serious violent offenders or overcrowding—itself a dangerous and potentially unconstitutional solution. Rikers’s 15,000 beds are plainly adequate to address a crime spike; the borough jails plan is playing with fire.

This practical question—where will the offenders go if crime goes up?—anticipates others: How much will the borough jails cost? When will they be ready? Mamdani and the closure advocates are not interested in asking or answering those questions because the goal of Rikers closure is not practical but spiritual: the expurgation of the sins that, proponents believe, inhere in not just the jail itself but incarceration as a practice.

Mamdani has been forced to concede that he cannot close Rikers on the fantastical timeline that Bill de Blasio originally imposed. But the mayor has always sold fantasies. That Rikers can safely close is just the latest. It won’t be the last.

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