Consider a singular fact. About one-half of the nation’s economic growth today is coming from the great data-center buildout. We’re not talking stock prices but real-world spending. Put inversely, stop all data-center expansion and the nation’s economic growth cuts in half.
Consider another fact. For a half-dozen years after 2008, a similar one-half of the nation’s GDP growth came from the great shale energy-tech expansion, a.k.a. the “fracking revolution.” If the fracking opponents of that day had prevailed with a ban, the country would have tilted in several of those years from an ongoing Great Recession (the mortgage collapse and banking crisis) into depression.
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Back then, despite the frack-ban movement’s relentless lobbying and its political allies, neither the Democrat-controlled Congress nor President Barack Obama complied. In no small irony, during the 2012 presidential debate with Mitt Romney, Obama not only took credit for the shale revolution (arguably deservedly, for not squelching it), but also in his second term signed the petroleum export legislation that helped fuel continued shale expansion. The latter has been an enduring gift to the U.S. and global economies and geopolitical security.
Now, consider myriad headlines in our current postelection season, such as one from The New Republic crowing that “Election Day 2026 revealed just how much of the country loathes Silicon Valley’s data center projects.” Or another asserting: “Voters overwhelmingly say no to data centers nationally.” [emphasis added] Really?
Few issues will be as immediately consequential as this one in illuminating the difference between campaigning and governing.
If the exit polls made any message clear, it was that the top issue for voters was the economy. In fact, of the top six issues cited, “the economy” and “foreign policy” were the only two with near-identical alignment between Democrats and Republicans.
In Gallup’s long-running monthly tracking poll—cataloging answers to “what do you think is the most important problem facing the country?”—worries about AI and tech don’t show up in the top 15 concerns. A separate Gallup poll in October prompted respondents to rank 11 problems by importance for their congressional vote. Data centers and climate change made the list but were ranked as the bottom two items.
True, November 3 saw the widely reported passage of 40 out of 41 ballot initiatives that oppose or would pause data centers. But nearly all those measures were in just three states—with over half in Ohio alone and another quarter in Illinois and Maine. Hardly a national response. (And those three states are home to just 10 percent of all planned data centers.) To be fair, preelection, nearly 600 communities had already imposed “active restrictions” on data centers. But, again, context matters. The nation has over 3,000 counties and nearly 20,000 incorporated towns and villages. It’s reasonable to expect that opinions may vary.
Meanwhile, at the state level, 12 elected governors made campaign promises involving a data-center pause: Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin. (Oregon, New York, and Texas already had bans.) While those dozen states don’t constitute a national trend, they do collectively account for 40 percent of all data centers now planned, i.e., not under construction.
It may be politically expedient to say “pause” rather than “ban.” It’s also likely legally consistent with a governor’s purview. But, given the financial stakes and the velocity of the data-center industry buildout, a pause is a distinction with no practical difference from a ban.
Once a giga-scale project is under development, delays can be very costly. Facing an uncertain length of pause, which many states have made clear will stretch well into next year, one rational response will be to go elsewhere. We can expect Wriston’s Law to reveal itself again: Capital “will go where it is wanted, stay where it is well-treated.”
Several dozen other states are friendlier to developers, including Ohio’s neighbor Pennsylvania, where the legislature did not enact a proposed multiyear moratorium. Instead, Governor Josh Shapiro’s preelection executive order imposed requirements that arguably fall in the category of normal for large-scale construction of any kind. Given just how big these projects are, entailing hundreds of billions of dollars, political analysts might start thinking about the economic and political fallout from the coming tectonic geographic realignment of capital.
Of course, even friendly states have conditions for site approvals. But it would be hard to take issue with any of the 25 questions the Urban Institute created as a checklist for communities to ask developers about “before a data center breaks ground.” And, in general, we’ve seen a convergence around three common principles, none of which most AI developers oppose: ending tax breaks for data centers, limiting (or reporting) water use, and paying for all associated power costs.
That said, all such accommodations won’t resolve the two big categories of national anxieties fueling the professional opposition movement. For some, data centers have become avatars for worries about AI’s impact on jobs and the culture, as well as the role of Big Tech in politics. And then there are the claims that data centers are imposing unprecedented physical burdens on land, water, and energy.
We will not easily settle debates about social impacts of technology in general, never mind about what AI promises or threatens, nor the issues of big business in politics. But those who would ban data centers or make it harder to build more of them will eventually have to deal with a reality that seems to have escaped everyone’s attention: the internet exists in data centers.
So much of what most people—indeed, 97 percent of U.S. adults—already do every day depends on using the internet, and data centers make it possible: not least e-commerce, virtual doctor visits, navigation, banking, homework, and streaming entertainment. Over three-fourths of the operating capacity in existing data centers is still conventional compute, not AI, even now, after several years of furious AI construction.
Here’s the rub for policymakers. Citizens have voted with their pocketbooks and pocket phones. They are voluntarily using far more of what the internet already offers. That trend is visible in terms with direct relevance for needing more digital hardware: upstream digital traffic has doubled in the past half-dozen years alone. Again, that’s coming mainly from conventional digital services, not because of AI (not yet).
Banning or slowing data-center expansion will hit everything that consumers have come to expect, including the expectation that internet-centric services will continually get better and easier to use. That improvement is precisely what AI can and will deliver long before it can deliver on the entirely new things that excite or frighten people.
As for critics’ constant referral to resource impacts on energy, water, and land, from building and operating data centers, nothing has changed since I wrote this summary earlier in the year:
Regarding energy, we can compare the power needed to move information versus the power required to transport physical goods. By 2035, if the U.S. ends up with all the AI data centers now forecast, the total power required by all of them will be less than one-tenth the total collective power under the hoods of all Class 8 trucks moving goods on the nation’s roads. The data-center demand hardly seems a heavy lift.
As for water and land, data centers use far less of both than golf courses, never mind agriculture. Where were the protesters when Congress enacted mandates and subsidies for corn-ethanol in gasoline? Nearly 200 times more water is used per gallon to produce ethanol than gasoline.
Finally, on land use: the total square footage of warehouses in America is, at present, almost 100-fold greater than for data centers. Again, where were the demonstrators when politicians and promoters started subsidizing solar power installations that blanket farmland and fragile deserts by the square mile with black, glass-covered silicon?
Forensic psychologists of the future will have a field day trying to figure out why opposition became so pervasive so fast. But it’s the near future that developers worry about. Currently, there’s roughly twice as much new capacity planned compared with what’s under construction, meaning hundreds of billions of dollars are in play. You can take it to the bank that a lot of those plans will move to friendly states.
But what looms over the industry is what Congress might yet try to do. As one postelection headline put it: “Democrats rode AI anxiety to victory. Now come data center limits, subpoenas and possible frontier model legislation.” While movements to oppose and halt new technologies have rarely succeeded, two earlier examples—one that succeeded and one that failed—are instructive.
Opposition to fracking, as noted, failed. Not because the movement wasn’t well-funded, or public opposition disappeared. Indeed, as Pew Research shows, a majority still oppose more fracking, as they did when President Obama signed into law overtly pro-fracking legislation. The simplest reason for the failure of the shale ban movement was that there remains no alternative to oil at scale. Demand was, and is, rising. (Increased U.S. oil production since 2008 equals half of all the world’s rise in demand since then.)
For the counterexample, consider the politically animated, hyperbole-infused, and disingenuous anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s. Opposition was responsible, in large measure, for ending U.S. commercial nuclear energy expansion. Through a combination of state and congressional actions, and inactions, the U.S. went, in a handful of years after 1979, from having nearly one-half of the world’s commercial nuclear power plants under construction to none. It’s still none, despite rejuvenated enthusiasm. Congress and the nation were lucky that this de facto nuclear ban didn’t cause an electricity shortage—that’s because there were options. Rather than rely on nukes, the U.S. doubled its coal consumption for electricity in the two decades following 1980.
With data centers, however, alternatives don’t exist. It’s one thing if the data-center buildout slows because a “bubble” of enthusiasm bursts, i.e., developers build faster than demand. But if a slowdown happens because politicians force one, despite rising demand, that’s a horse of a different color.
In the face of national sand-in-the-gears policies, the only option open to AI developers is to build overseas. Notably, the day after the election, Google announced a $15 billion expansion to a $2 billion plan launched in 2024 to build data centers in Malaysia, a country with lots of low-cost electricity, with some 80 percent of its grid fired with coal and gas. Other energy-rich countries might yet beckon—Mexico, even Canada.
The new Congress convenes on January 3. Then it will be time not to campaign but to govern. The jury is out on whether a majority has the appetite to try and deliberately squelch a sector driving one-half of GDP growth. One ray of hope: according to The Hill, environmental activists and Big Tech joined together before the election to work on a “common national framework for responsible data center development.” The devil is, as they say, in the details. But this is a good sign.