Keir Starmer became prime minister despite winning the votes of just 20 percent of those on the country’s voting rolls in a 2024 election that epitomized growing indifference by some, and anger in others, toward Britain’s ruling elite. (Andrew Testa/The New York Times/Redux)

Every nation has the government it deserves, wrote Joseph de Maistre in 1811—a deceptively simple statement containing both truth and falsehood. What, after all, did I do, and millions like me, to deserve the government of former Prime Minister Keir Starmer (or, for that matter, any of Britain’s recent governments)? After all, 80 percent of the population did not vote for him.

On the other hand, no government emerges fully formed, like Venus from the sea, without cultural, political, economic, psychological, and social antecedents. In a representative democracy, our rulers represent us in more than one sense. A country’s political class mirrors its population; what we see in that mirror in Britain is far from reassuring.

The population holds the political class in almost universal contempt. It has been a long time since I have heard anything neutral, let alone complimentary, said about it—anything other than, “They are all the same,” or “They are all in it for themselves.” I often join that chorus myself. But when someone concludes that voting is therefore pointless, I part company. There is always a better and a worse. One votes not so much for a politician as against the alternatives.

Careerism, opportunism, and narcissism are the faith, hope, and charity of today’s political class, sometimes combined with bad ideas. An absence of character seems almost a requirement for our leaders, sometimes seemingly inscribed on their faces. Looking at the blankness of David Cameron, say, or of Starmer, what character, other than an absence of character, appears there? Unfortunately, an absence of character, unmarked by either life or experience, is not incompatible with great ambition. Indeed, ambition becomes the substitute for character.

The one recent exception, perhaps, was Boris Johnson, but he had personality rather than character: moreover, a personality that he invented for himself and carefully curated. In one devastating anecdote, which I have noted before, he emerges from an elevator and, thinking himself unobserved, looks into the mirror opposite and musses up his hair to make it look as though he had just got out of bed. Dishevelment, be thou my elegance, for the sake of the public image I am creating.

Unlike other recent leaders, Johnson was unafraid to make a joke for fear of offending a voter, a fear that leads inexorably to the grimmest of combinations: earnestness without seriousness. But a man playing a part long enough, even that of a buffoon, eventually becomes what he pretends to be. He ends as a character actor, not a man of character.

The political class is responsible for decisions with profound consequences, and incompetence and stupidity at the top are bound not so much to trickle as to pour torrentially over the rest of society.

Gordon Brown, when finance minister, sold more than half of Britain’s gold reserves—already less than a third of what they had been in 1950—between 1999 and 2002, at a profound low in the price of gold. He overruled advice not to do so and, by the method of sale he chose, depressed the price still further, securing the worst possible deal for the country just before gold began its dizzying ascent. This astonishing act of intellectual hubris, as though Brown had glimpsed the final demise of gold as a store of value after three or four millennia, has cost the country tens of billions in reserves. Yet it carried no political cost: he became prime minister in 2007. Though by no means as avid for adulation as his erstwhile master, Anthony (“Call me Tony,” now Sir Tony) Blair, he is still sometimes presented, or wheeled out, as a wise elder statesman of public policy. Perhaps his lack of common sense, fortified by a dash of ideology, was only what one might have expected of a Ph.D. in history and a former lecturer in politics at Edinburgh University and the Glasgow College of Technology.

Our senior politicians appear to live in a looking-glass world. They have only to be confronted with a choice to make the wrong one. I am reminded of a student in my long-distant past who consistently scored lower on multiple-choice examinations than chance would have predicted. It was as though he possessed a kind of knowledge, but the mirror image of the true variety.

Britain’s energy policy has been astonishing: a catalog of error, almost suicidal in its scope. In 1956, Britain became the first country to generate electricity for its national grid from nuclear power. By 1995, nuclear energy supplied a quarter of the country’s electricity. Since then, however, the nuclear contribution has fallen sharply, in both relative and absolute terms, to about 15 percent of demand. As Britain allowed its nuclear industry to wither, it also lost the capacity to build new power stations. France, by contrast, despite some decline, still generates nearly 70 percent of its electricity from nuclear power.

In an act of moral grandiosity, Britain adopted a legally binding net-zero carbon-emissions policy, enacted in 2019 by a Conservative—or nominally conservative—government. Yet Britain emits considerably less than 1 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases, so eliminating its emissions altogether would have no discernible effect on global warming (even assuming that such warming is entirely the product of greenhouse-gas emissions). The policy supposedly made the country a moral exemplar, but an exemplar is an example only if someone is watching, cares deeply, and is prepared to follow suit. The idea that China or India would, or should, take any notice of what Britain did is laughable, yet another sign of earnest unseriousness, or perhaps unserious earnestness.

The pursuit of net zero has produced absurdities that would be comic were they not so damaging to the country. So-called renewable energy sources, whose equipment is almost entirely manufactured abroad and will itself one day have to be replaced, are so heavily subsidized that British electricity is among the most expensive in the world—roughly twice as costly as in much of Europe and four times as expensive as in the United States. What remains of Britain’s manufacturing industry has been undermined, while leaving many households, especially the poorest, scarcely able to heat their homes in winter.

Perhaps the aesthetic destruction of the countryside by wind turbines and solar panels on farmland is not of great importance to most people. But it has brought the country neither security nor reliability in its energy supply. Sometimes too hot the eye of heaven shines, or the rain it raineth every day; often the wind bloweth where it listeth. Thus, Britain sometimes generates too much electricity and, more often, too little.

When it produces too much electricity, Britain must either export the surplus—often paying countries such as the Netherlands to take it—or pay producers to stop generating it, just as farmers are paid to leave fields fallow, or both. When it produces too little, it must pay to import it. Because renewable energy is so capricious, there must also be a backup system, namely natural gas, which still accounts for 25 percent of electricity generation. Britain imports most of its natural gas from Norway, from North Sea fields directly adjacent to its own, which it refuses to develop for supposedly ecological reasons. I am no mercantilist, but with a current account deficit that has persisted for more than 40 years, a national debt equal to 100 percent of GDP, a government deficit of 4.2 percent (largely to finance the 52 percent of the population that receives more in public expenditure than it contributes), and debt-service costs almost twice as high as spending on national defense in these perilous times, there must be something to be said—quite apart from strategic considerations—for producing our own gas and oil.

In addition, the country’s maximum gas-storage capacity now stands at just 12 days and, at times of high demand, falls to just two. Cold and darkness beckon, and people may have to warm themselves with the thought that, by their shivering and misery, they are saving the planet—though not by much. Britain still depends on oil and gas for 75 percent of its overall energy needs, which means that this Walpurgisnacht of policy idiocy—common to both formerly hegemonic political parties—will have prevented less than 0.25 percent, or one four-hundredth, of the world’s greenhouse-gas emissions (and, in fact, less than that, because energy generation and use are not the only sources of such emissions).

Wherever one looks, one sees the same pattern of self-mutilating government decision-making. Paralysis struggles with chaos for dominance. A high-speed rail line between London, Manchester, and Leeds was first proposed in 2009 and approved in 2012. Yet the first trains—on the truncated route between London and Birmingham—are not expected to run until sometime between 2033 and 2036. If the project’s habitual delays are any guide, the later date would be the safer prediction.

Japan inaugurated its first high-speed rail line in 1964, Italy in 1977, France in 1981, Spain in 1992, China in 2008, and even Morocco by 2018. France took just seven years to build the line between Paris and Lyon; Britain, by contrast, will take at least 21 years to build a line less than half as long. The difference can hardly be explained by concern for passenger safety: in the 45 years since the TGV (train à grande vitesse) entered service, no passenger has ever been killed on one, and the system now extends over 1,700 miles of track.

It will cost Britain about twice as much, and take appreciably longer, to build the line from London to Birmingham (with a possible extension to Manchester, not expected to open until 2040) as Spain spent building its entire 2,500-mile high-speed rail network, second only to China’s in length. Admittedly, rail lines are more difficult and costly to build in densely populated countries, but that can hardly explain a cost per mile more than 20 times as high.

I leave aside whether, from a purely economic point of view, a high-speed line between London and Manchester was ever a wise investment. Fast and comfortable trains are delightful for passengers, but seldom in human history—given modern electronic means of communication—has it been less economically necessary to cut 45 minutes from such a journey. My point is that the episode demonstrates the country’s administrative incapacity: chaotic and paralytic at the same time.

I am reminded of Marc Bloch’s analysis of the French military in 1940 in The Strange Defeat: its proliferation of ranks, offices, hierarchies, paperwork, and internal jealousies, none of it directed by any overarching sense of purpose beyond the imperative to follow procedure. Where bureaucracy becomes an end in itself, it guarantees continued employment, albeit at the expense of any genuine activity or achievement.

Wherever one looks in Britain, one sees the division of responsibilities, the proliferation of organizations, and the multiplication of procedures, supposedly to prevent mistakes or corruption but, in reality, manifestations of what one could call legalized corruption. The official British inquiry into the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic will, by the time it concludes, have taken more than four years and cost 200 times as much as Sweden’s, which reported after just two years. Does anyone imagine that its findings will therefore be 200 times as thorough, wise, honest, or intellectually sound because it cost 200 times as much? On the contrary, like most modern official inquiries, the British inquiry became a trough at which lawyers, officials, and experts could feed.

The effects of this legal corruption are evident throughout the administration. Though Britain spends more on defense than France, for example, it was recently unable to deploy a single ship during the crisis in the Persian Gulf, while France deployed seven. The Ministry of Defence employs over 75 percent more bureaucrats than the Royal Navy has sailors. One might call this, metaphorically, the Bolivianization of the Royal Navy: all admirals and no ships—though the Bolivians have at least the excuse of having no coastline.

To this mixture of chaos and paralysis, and partly as a cause of both, is added ideology. The recent shocking case of Henry Nowak, the young student arrested while dying from stab wounds after being falsely accused of making racist remarks, was only an extreme example of what we have come to expect from our police, whom much of the population now view as lazy, incompetent, malicious, and stupid (too often with reason—though, of course, not always).

Such decomposition does not occur overnight, and the degradation of the British police has been underway for a long time, as I have chronicled. One important turning point was the Macpherson Report into the murder of a young black man by five white thugs and the failure of the police to secure their conviction. The murder took place in 1993; the report was not published until 1999—a delay that by itself tells us something about the efficiency of the British state. By far the most important lines in the report were the following recommendations:

That the definition of a racist incident should be: A racist incident is any incident which is perceived by the victim or any other person. [And] that the term “racist incident” must be understood to include crimes and non-crimes in policing terms. Both must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment. [Furthermore,] that this definition should be universally adopted by the Police, local Government and other relevant agencies.

Here is the intellectual basis for the arrest of Nowak: a manifesto for the simultaneous creation and avoidance of work, for the pursuit of chimeras and the disregard of real monsters (the former being more fashionable, and so much easier). The only excuse for the report’s author, the experienced Scottish judge Sir William Macpherson, is that he was acting under intimidation, both intellectual and, during the public hearings, physical.

The stupidity of police behavior, from the lowest to the highest echelons, is not caused by a lack of intelligence or brainpower. It is the effect of what might be called artificial unintelligence, which has proved more destructive in its effects than anything AI has so far managed. The minds of many police officers have been colonized, as if by a mental virus or prion: ideas, or fragments of ideas, that induce a permanent state of fear, usually subliminal until reality intrudes, when that fear prevents them from confronting it honestly. Senior police officers become political apparatchiks, preserving their self-respect by professing belief in ideological shibboleths: not those of the general population, or even of a majority, but of its hyperactive monomaniacs and ideological entrepreneurs.

No doubt the spread of higher education has contributed to the growth of an ideological class—that is to say, a class that thinks through the prism of ideology, whatever that ideology may be—such that one now expects more sense from a plumber or a carpenter than from many university graduates. At any rate, the corrosive effects of ideologization are profound and ubiquitous.

The council of the small and generally peaceful town in which I live recently held one of its regular meetings, unusually well attended by the public. Normally, no one attends except me, when I am in town, and perhaps one or two others. On this occasion, however, a matter of vital importance—at least to about 50 people—was on the agenda: whether the rainbow flag should be flown from one of the principal public buildings and the seventeenth-century town hall, a splendid—though now slightly neglected—edifice, illuminated in pink for the annual Gay Pride parade.

The councillors were probably intimidated into acquiescence. Certainly, the one councillor, a man in his seventies, who spoke against the proposal, pointing out the contradiction between the demand for equality and the demand for special consideration, was shouted at and insulted as though he were a bigot. After the meeting, he was followed home in a menacing manner and subjected to further abuse.

Yet peaceful though my town may be, it is not without other problems. Its high street and many of its other roads, for example, are badly pitted with potholes after years of neglected maintenance. The town and county councils merely paint a white line around each pothole, thereby absolving themselves, legally, of responsibility for damage to vehicles that strike them. But the condition of the roads has never aroused anything like the passion provoked by the question of flying the rainbow flag from a municipal building. Sectional interest triumphs over the common interest.

Small groups of highly motivated ideologues thus impose their views and policies on an indifferent, or even mildly hostile, majority and distort public decision-making. This reflects a fundamental problem—not unique to Britain, but particularly acute there: an ever-weaker sense of a common identity, especially among the politically active, that binds together the demos of a democracy and enables it to deal peacefully with differences. In a world of multiple ideologies, competing though sometimes forming tactical coalitions, being Muslim is, for Muslims, the most important thing, or the only thing; being a woman is, for some women, the most important thing; being homosexual is, for some homosexuals, most important; reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is, for environmentalists, the overriding concern; and so on almost ad infinitum. Political legitimacy thus becomes a matter solely of following prescribed rules, and pressure groups become adept at manipulating them. Conflict has always existed in society and always will; but without an overarching sense of common purpose, there is little prospect of resolving it. And where society becomes ungovernable, can force or violence be far behind?  

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