In the wake of the joint U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran last summer and this past February, counterterrorism experts and government officials have identified the prospect of Iranian sleeper cells on American soil as a serious threat. The arrest earlier this month of Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi offers a stark reminder that that threat is real.
A Kata’ib Hizballah commander working closely with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), al-Saadi was allegedly directing bombings of synagogues, Jewish schools, and American financial institutions abroad while simultaneously mapping out a Manhattan synagogue for attack. According to the federal complaint, he explained his motivations for attacking Jews as “either they eradicate us, or we eradicate them.” He now stands accused of six terrorism-related offenses.
Finally, a reason to check your email.
Sign up for our free newsletter today.
The episode highlights with rare comprehensiveness the interlocking problems of global Islamist terrorism, American immigration policy, and a fixation with Jews and Jewish institutions—particularly those that openly support Israel. Preventing such incidents means hardening both our border and the nation’s Jewish institutions—before the next al-Saadi succeeds.
Al-Saadi’s indictment should put to rest questions about whether Iran and its allies are willing to attack civilian sites to pressure the United States. The IRGC remains a textbook terror enterprise, and attacks on foreign soil are no small part of its portfolio.
The Justice Department alleges that al-Saadi, an Iraqi national, was involved in nearly 20 attacks and attempted attacks throughout Europe and the United States. He allegedly coordinated with several criminal syndicates through messaging platforms like Telegram and Snapchat—including making cryptocurrency payments—to plan attacks against American nationals, financial centers, and religious communities. The alleged operations included firebombing branches of American banks in Amsterdam and Paris and stabbing two people in London.
That most of these efforts were unsuccessful is a testament to the outstanding work of intelligence and law enforcement officials. These individuals recognize that the IRGC is not easily deterred from its goal of destabilizing the West and winning its war of eradication.
Stopping Iran from achieving that goal requires constant vigilance. Individuals inside America’s borders who show sympathy for the Iranian regime make easy recruits to fund, support, and assist in carrying out terrorism. Organizations that do Iran’s bidding on American soil, whether coordinating with the IRGC or out of their own sympathies, may be fronts raising funds for terrorist activities. Investigations into organizations that run interference for Iran and its proxies while posing as humanitarian nonprofits or media outlets are long overdue.
It’s also notable that al-Saadi was undone by an agent posing as a member of a Mexican drug cartel. Trump administration officials have been adamant that President Biden’s weak border policies created significant national security risks. Al-Saadi’s actions prove them right.
That drug networks and terrorism operations are intertwined makes perfect sense. Cartels, arguably the only organizations more vicious than terrorist groups, don’t care whether American civilians suffer and die—that is their business model. And they are experts in moving people and contraband materials undetected. Despite their different overall objectives, seasoned terror leaders apparently think of the cartels as natural partners.
Lax border security and an inability to keep track of who has entered the country are real security risks. Terrorist networks count on porous borders and inadequate screening to embed operatives. The question of who funded al-Saadi, who housed his operatives, and what support networks exist inside the United States remains open. But by definition, aliens who supported his efforts (or are at this moment attempting to continue his work) are here illegally, either because they entered without authorization or because they are violating the terms of admission. There is no reason such individuals should spend another minute on American soil.
Al-Saadi’s plot highlights another sad reality: Jewish institutions are going to be targets. Homegrown terrorists with Islamist sympathies, such as the man who tried to massacre Jewish children in West Bloomfield, Michigan, think of synagogues and Jewish community centers first when considering how to strike at Israel. International terror masterminds make the same calculation when it comes to attacking the United States. They see synagogues as both soft targets and clear ways to spread the message that support for Israel is unacceptable.
Hardening Jewish institutional security seems like a local political issue, but it is really a tool in the simmering global war between the United States and Islamist adversaries. Programs like the NYPD’s Strategic Response Group—workaday, unglamorous community-intelligence and protective-security work—stand between the ongoing sleeper-cell threat and a crowded synagogue on a Saturday morning. In that sense, they are the underappreciated defense against Iran’s attempts to wage a war on Western civilization on our home turf.
If al-Saadi had succeeded in his murderous mission, Americans would understandably agonize about when and where the next act of Iranian-backed terrorism would emerge. We need to take steps now to add a dose of realism to our immigration policy and enforcement, harden our soft targets, and minimize the risk that our enemies make headway in their war of annihilation.